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Selective Detention and the Exclusionary Rule
A common police practice is to stop and question persons the police
suspect are or will be engaged in, or have knowledge of, criminal activ-
ities, but whom they cannot arrest due to lack of probable cause.1 Such
practices have become known as detentions and have recently attracted
widespread attention and comment2 because of the passage of the New
York "Stop and Frisk" Act 8 and the increasing recognition of the con-
stitutional validity of these detentions by state and lower federal
courts.
4
1 LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY, 801-02, 317 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as ARREST]; Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention,
Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General,
51 J. Calm. L., C. & P.S. 386, 389 (1960); Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52
Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 18 (1957); see Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest,
54 J. CRua. L., C. & P.S. 393 (1963).
2 In general, commentators have approved of detentions and supported their con-
stitutionality. See Kuh, Reflections on New York's "Stop and Frisk" Law and Its Claimed
Unconstitutionality, 56 J. CmM. L., C. 9- P.S. 32 (1965); Leagre, supra note 1, at 406-16;
Remington, supra note 1, at 389-91; Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York's
"Stop and Frisk" Law, 38 FORDM L. REv. 211 (1964); Siegel, The New York "Frisk"
and "Knock-Not" Statutes: Are They Constitutional? 30 BROOKLYN L. REv. 274 (1964);
Vorenburg, Police Detention and Interrogation of Uncounselled Suspects: The Supreme
Court and the States, 44 B.U.L. Rlv. 423 (1964); Comment, Police Power To Stop, Frisk
and Question Suspicious Persons, 65 COLUM. L. Rv. 848 (1965); Comment, The Law of
Arrest: Constitutionality of Detention and Frisk Statutes, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 641 (1964);
Note, 50 CoRNEL L.Q. 529 (1965). But see Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or
Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J. Calm. L., C. c P.S. 402 (1960); Souris, Stop and
Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use and Misuse of Euphemisms, Symposium on the
Supreme Court and the Police: 1966, 57 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 251 (1966). See also Reich,
Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161 (1966) (outlining the prob-
lems involved when detentions are based on little or no grounds for suspicion and
questioning the desirability of permitting police to exercise preventative functions).
3 N.Y. CODE CeaM. PRoc. § 180-a, noted in 78 HARv. L. REv. 473 (1964).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823
(1962); United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States ex. rel.
Robinson v. Fay, 239 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp.
71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d
408 (2d Cir. 1960); Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 859 (1964); People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956); People v.
Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943); People v. Henneman, 367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E.2d
649 (1937) (dictum); State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 1334, 125 N.W.2d 825 (1964); State ex. rel.
Branchaud v. Hedman, 269 Minn. 375, 180 N. W.2d 628 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 907
(1965); State v. Hope, 85 N.J. Super. 551, 205 A.2d 457 (App. Div. 1964); People v. Rivera,
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Arrests and detentions may be distinguished by the degree of inter-
ference with the liberty of the person. A detention may be of limited
duration, the person detained may not be removed from the area in
which he was stopped, and the stigmatizing effect may be minimal.5
14 N.Y2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); People v. Salerno,
38 Misc. 2d 467, 235 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1962); City of South Euclid v. Di Franco, 4
Ohio Misc. 148, 206 N.E.2d 432, 434 (Munic. Ct. 1965); State v. Zupan, 155 Wash. 80, 288
Pac. 671 (1929).
The Supreme Court has not passed definitively upon the constitutionality of detentions
despite opportunities to do so. One such opportunity arose in Rios v. United States, 864
U.S. 253 (1960). Two Los Angeles policemen had followed a taxicab from an apartment
house parking lot in an area known for narcotics activity. When the cab stopped for a
traffic light, the officers approached it from either side. Although the order of events is
unclear both in the record and the opinion, it appears that a door of the cab was
opened, the defendant dropped a recognizable package of narcotics, and one of the
officers drew his revolver. The Government argued in its brief for explicit recognition
of the policeman's right to detain suspects briefly for questioning on grounds less than
probable cause for arrest where "reasonable grounds for inquiry" exist. Brief for United
States, p. 11, Rios v. United States, 864 U.S. 253 (1960). However, the Court avoided
deciding the issue directly by remanding the case for a finding of the precise moment
when the arrest took place. 364 U.S. at 261-62. Another opportunity was presented in
Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 368 U.S. 516 (1962), a case in which the Supreme Court dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question an appeal from a decision of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of detentions. See Kavanagh
v. Stenhouse, 93 R.I. 252, 174 A.2d 560 (1961); Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant,
pp. 5-7, Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 868 U.S. 516 (1962). See also Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 104-06 (1959) (Clark, J., dissenting). Thus, although the Court has not squarely
upheld the constitutionality of detentions, it has given no indication that detentions
are unconstitutional, and at least one state court has interpreted Rios as recognizing
the constitutional validity of detentions. Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 202,
196 N.E.2d 840, 844 (1964).
5 Many articles have discussed the proper limitations on detentions and have argued
that because detentions are so limited, the interference with the person is reasonable. See,
e.g., Leagre, supra note 1, at 407-18; Kuh, supra note 3, at 35; Vorenburg, supra note 2,
at 424-26; Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 317-24 (1942); Cf.
Aaaxsr 346-47. These commentators agree that detentions should be limited to persons
who are "abroad in a public place" in order that a person's home may not be entered
to interrogate him as it may be to arrest him. This proposition is consistent with the
detentions upheld in the cases. See cases cited note 4 supra. Although the Missouri and
Hawaii statutes provide no limitations on where a suspect may be located when detained,
the other five states whose statutes sanction detentions authorize detaining only persons
who are "abroad in a public place." DE.L. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902 (1953); HAwAii Rxv.
LAws tit. 30, §§ 255-4, -5 (1955); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, 98 (1961); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 544.170 (1955); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 594:2-3 (1955); N.Y. CODE CRM. PROC.
§ 180-a; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 12-7-1, -2 (1956). It has also been argued that unless
additional evidence linking the suspect with a crime is forthcoming, the detention
should be limited by providing that the inquiry be made in the vicinity of the stop-
ping, rather than at the stationhouse, and by insisting that the time the person is
detained be only that needed to make requests for the desired information and to run
a very quick check on the suspect's identification and statements, if possible. See MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEmDU § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 1, March 1, 1966) (twenty
minute time limit on detentions, parties may not be removed from area where detention
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By enabling police to stop persons who have not yet committed crimes,
detentions permit police to engage in aggressive patrol practices which
prevent crimes.6 Preliminary investigation of past crimes is often
furthered by detentions which allow the police to obtain information
from persons (e.g., bystanders) they could not arrest, and which enable
them to release the obviously innocent7 No matter how brief the
detention, however, adequate provision for the safety of the detaining
policemen demands that the policemen be allowed to "frisk" (or search
for weapons) those detained persons whom they suspect may have
weapons.8
There is a readily apparent tension between the fourth amendment's
protection of the individual from unreasonable searches and seizures
and the unlimited use of detentions-restraining individuals on
grounds insufficient to provide probable cause for arrest.9 While fairly
occurs). The statutes of four states-Delaware (2 hours), Missouri (20 hours), New Hamp-
shire (4 hours), and Rhode Island (2 hours)-provide that the duration of the detention
be limited to a specified number of hours, although they do not limit the detention to
on-the-street investigation. However, the Massachusetts and New York statutes limit
detentions by providing that the investigation can take place only in the vicinity of
the stopping. The fact that the questioning conducted under these circumstances should
be less intensive, as well as less prolonged, than stationhouse interrogation should help
establish that this is a lesser interference with personal freedom than an arrest. Further-
more, the stigmatization resulting from an arrest record, booking, and fingerprinting is
lacking in a detention. AyajsT 346-48; Kuh, supra note 2, at 35; cf. United States
v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United
States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
6 Vorenburg, supra note 2, at 425 (aggressive patrol including detention is an important
police procedure especially in urban areas); Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free
Society: A Plea for Modernization, 51 J. Cams. L., C. & P.S. 395, 397-98 (1960). For some
evidence of the importance of routine patrol in solving crimes and reducing the crime
rate in an urban area, see the discussion of the saturation policy in Foote, supra note 2,
at 405.
7 See, e.g., ARim 344-45; Vorenburg, supra note 2, at 424-25; cf. United States v.
Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481
(1966) (dictum upholding police power to make preliminary investigations).
8 See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
978 (1965). A frisk "is a contact or patting of the outer clothing of a person to detect
by the sense of touch if a concealed weapon is being carried." Id. at 446, 201 N.E.2d
at 85.
9 See, e.g., Foote, supra note 2, at 402-03; Vorenburg, supra note 2, at 423-25.
It should be noted that the cases upholding detentions have given some indications
that the scope of police power to detain is very extensive. See cases cited note 4 supra.
Thus, in People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 212, 47 N.E.2d 56, 60 (1943), the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the police could lawfully stop and question a man sitting in a parked
car late at night in the vicinity of thefts reported earlier that night. In People v. Martin,
46 Cal. 2d. 106, 108, 293 P.2d 52, 53 (1956), the California Supreme Court stated that
"the presence of two men in a parked automobile on a lover's lane late at night was
itself reasonable cause for police investigation." That court has also upheld police
power to stop and question the occupants of a cab double-parked in front of a hotel
at 3 aam., People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 56 (1956), two young men walking
flexible but ascertainable standards of probable cause limit arrests and
the searches incident to them,10 no comparable standards have been
developed for detentions or for the limits of searches incident to them.
Furthermore, it would seem that the standard for determining when
a person may be detained-usually expressed as "reasonable grounds
for suspicion," or some equivalent phrase-is not capable of precise
delineation.1
through a warehouse district late at night, People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d
531 (1955), and even two men in a moving vehicle near the scene of a recent crime
where one of the men resembled the description given of one of the participants, People
v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963). Other state courts
have recognized detentions as reasonable where the police have observed activity on the
part of the suspect indicating that he may be fleeing the scene of a burglary, People v.
Ambrose, 155 Cal. App. 2d 513, 318 P.2d 181 (1957); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass.
197, 196 N.E.2d 840 (1964); see People v. Garcia, 20 App. Div. 2d 855, 248 N.Y.S.2d 154
(1964), or that he is preparing to commit a crime, People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441,
201 N.E.2d 32 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d
122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966). There has even been some explicit recognition of the
right to seal off an area through roadblocks to catch the perpetrators of a very recent
major crime. See Comment, Interference with the Right to Free Movement, Stopping and
Search of Vehicles, 51 CALiF. L. REv. 907, 916 & n.79 (1963), and authorities cited therein.
See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
10 The Supreme Court has stated that: "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and
circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1958), quoting from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925) (brackets in original).
11 Although the standards articulated for detentions have been challenged for vague-
ness, see Foote, supra note 2, at 403-07 (challenging for vagueness any standard less than
probable cause of arrest); 78 HIv. L. REv. 473, 477 (1964); 38 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 392,
403-04 (1964) (the last two works mentioning possible challenges to the New York statute
for vagueness), it has been asserted that there is "no reason to suspect that the
Court . . . [is] incapable of eliciting fundamental standards through a process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion," just as it has developed criteria in the "probable cause for
arrest" cases. Leagre, supra note 1, at 420. However, both statutes and judicial authorities
have failed to articulate dearly the need for the power to detain and the reasons for
its outweighing the individual's right to be free from disturbance. Instead, such authorities
rely on the mere assertion that detentions are reasonable restraints. See Paulsen, Criminal
Law Administration: The Zero Hour Was Coming, in Symposium on the Contributions
of Roger J. Traynor, 53 CA.X. L. REv. 103, 110-11 (1965). Furthermore, the courts have
been unable to set any meaningful minimum standards for determining when "reasonable
grounds for suspicion" exist and show little inclination to do so. See cases cited note 4
supra. In fact, only two cases which hold that detentions were unreasonable because
"reasonable ground to suspect" did not exist have been found. Porter v. Wilson, 245
F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (no reason to suspect two men merely because they were
riding in an automobile in the predawn hours); People v. Anonymous, 48 Misc. 2d 713,
265 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Nassau County Ct. 1965) (no reason to suspect a young man carrying
a box of books along a street on Sunday). The threshold for reasonable ground to sus-
pect is so low that the distinction between the included cases and the excluded cases
seems an impossible one to make. Compare People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52
(1956) with Porter v. Wilson, 245 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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If a detention may serve the purposes of an arrest, including allow-
ing the police to make an evidentiary search of the person, the protec-
tion from unreasonable searches and seizures which the Supreme
Court has provided through the concept of "probable cause" may be
effectively circumscribed by a simple change in terminology.'2 Yet if
detentions are held illegal per se, the police will have lost a valuable
tool for preventing crimes and making preliminary investigations.
From a practical standpoint, it appears important to develop a system
which will allow police to use detentions for preliminary investigations
and crime prevention with adequate provision for police safety with-
out impairing the individual's freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures. This comment examines whether, through legislative or
judicial regulation of searches incident to detentions, safeguards may
be devised which can reasonably accommodate these competing
interests.
I. THE ROLE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
IN ARREST AND SEARCH LAW
The fourth amendment, which articulates a general right against
"unreasonable searches and seizures,"' 3 has long been held to govern
arrests and presumably applies to lesser physical interferences with the
person as well.' 4 The expression "probable cause" found in the amend-
ment has been used as a measure of the reasonableness of arrests in
general.' 5 Although it has been argued that probable cause for arrest
is an absolute standard which will not justify interferences of any sort
based on less than probable cause for arrest,' 6 it seems more logical, 7
and more consistent with authority,'5 to regard probable cause as a
standard, flexible within limits, that balances the need for interference
with the extent of interference.
12 See, e.g., Foote, supra note 2, at 404-05; Vorenburg, supra note 2, at 425.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14 E.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958); Albrecht v. United
States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927); Foote, supra note 2, at 403.
15 See note 10 supra for a recent definition of probable cause by the Supreme Court.
16 Foote, supra note 2, at 403-05 (assuming that these interferences are police inter-
ferences made with a view to enforcement of the criminal law).
17 Leagre, supra note 1, at 399, 403-06, 417-20; Comment, supra note 2, 65 COLUM. L.
R.y, at 858; Comment, supra note 2, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. at 654-55; see AyaaasT 346 & n.15;
Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv.
46, 63.
18 E.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Wrightson v. United States, 222
F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948);
see Wolbrette, Detention for Questioning in Louisiana, 39 TUL. L. R-v. 69, 75-77 (1964).
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The fourth amendment's requirement that all searches be reason-
able has been held to permit searches of the person incident to valid
arrests.' 9 Since probable cause must exist for an arrest to be valid, there
often is a sufficient connection between the individual and criminality
to warrant a belief that he may have on his person either evidence of
the crime of which he is suspected or weapons. In either case, a search
is valid.20 In addition, guidelines imposing limitations on such searches
have been developed: it has been held that the permissible area of
search incident to an arrest can extend beyond the arrestee's person
to premises within his control at the time of arrest; 21 however, the
search must be closely related in time and space to the arrest22 and
reasonably designed to produce weapons and direct evidence-fruits
or instrumentalities-of the crime of which the accused is suspected.23
19 E.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950); Comment, Search and Seizure, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 611, 616-20 (1964).
20 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217, 238 (1960); Comment, supra note 19, 59 Nw. U.L. RV. at 617-18 & nn.48-50.
21 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 62 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947).
22 See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), a case in which three men seated
in a car were arrested for vagrancy. After their arrest the car was towed to a garage
and searched there. The search was held not to be incident to a valid arrest. In Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), A, B, and others were arrested at B's home. A search
of A's home a short time later was held not to be incident to the arrest.
23 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1950). The police may search only
for items connected with the crime and weapons with which the defendant might resist
or escape. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961); McIntire v. United
States, 217 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 953 (1955). In the federal
courts, at least, merely evidentiary matter such as letters and personal papers, as dis-
tinguished from direct evidence such as contraband or instrumentalities of a crime, has
been held not properly subject to seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, supra,
at 64 n.6 and cases cited therein; United States v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) (primary object of search incident to arrest can not be documentary evidence).
If items other than instrumentalities or fruits of the crime suspected come into the
possession of the arresting officer through a search reasonably designed to uncover these
fruits or instrumentalities, they are admissible if they are instrumentalities of another
crime and are recognized as such, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 238 (1960), or if
the possession of them is a crime in itself, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
The arresting officer cannot make a general exploratory search, Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931); he "must have in mind some reasonably
specific thing he is looking for and reasonable grounds to believe it is in the place being
searched," United States v. Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Del. 1962), and the fact that
forfeited property, such as a weapon, turns up does not validate the search. Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, supra; United States v. Tate, supra. Under recent inter-
pretation, the constitutional requirements are probably the same as in federal courts.
See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Comment, The Federal Standard of Search and
Seizure, 13 DRAKE L. REv. 65-66 (1963).
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The overriding requirement in both arrests and searches, "reason-
ableness," is not based on precise distinctions, 24 but rather is appar-
ently the product of a balancing of practical considerations: the need
for the search, arrest, or other restraint on personal freedom is bal-
anced against the actual amount of interference with the person caused
by the restraint.
II. TENSION BETWEEN THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND DETENTIONS
The use of detentions by the police has been criticized on the ground
that the fourth amendment forbids any police interference with the
person unless the police have probable cause for arrest.25 However,
since in arrest and search law the reasonableness of the restriction in-
volves a balancing of the needs for the restriction and the actual hard-
ship imposed, it would seem that judging lesser interferences such as
detentions on the basis of reasonableness under the particular circum-
stances of each case would not necessarily violate the fourth amend-
ment simply because the threshold of probable cause for arrest was not
achieved.2 6 Another criticism of the use of detentions is that the stan-
dards for judging whether a detention is reasonable are so indefinite
as to be unconstitutionally vague.2 7 Thus, the New York "stop and
frisk" law, which provides that "a police officer may stop any person
abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing,
has committed or is about to commit a felony or any of ... [certain
serious misdemeanors] and may demand of him his name, address and
an explanation of his actions," 28 has been charged with setting uncon-
stitutionally vague standards.29 However, courts, both in states where
24 For example, it is not an automatic rule that everyone arrested may be searched.
To justify such a search it must be shown that it was reasonable to believe that one of
the justifications advanced above, see text accompanying note 20 supra, would be appli-
cable. Comment, supra note 19, 59 Nw. U.L. R.v. at 619 & n.61, and authorities cited
therein. Even a search for weapons incidental to a lawful arrest may be unreasonable
in some circumstances. For example, in United States v. Tate, supra note 23, a police-
man had arrested Tate for speeding and after Tate had resisted, the policeman hand-
cuffed him and placed him in the patrol car. Then the policeman searched Tate's car
and found a sawed-off shotgun. The court held that the search was unreasonable since
there was no indication of what the policeman was looking for in the car.
25 Foote, supra note 2, at 407.
26 ARREST 346; Leagre, supra note 1, at 406-08, 411-16; Comment, supra note 2, 65
COLUM. L. REv. at 858; Comment, supra note 2, 59 Nw. U.L. Rv. at 652-55.
27 See, e.g., Foote, supra note 2, at 403-07.
28 N.Y. CODE CraIM. PROC. § 180-a.
29 See the discussion of this argument in 78 HARv. L. REV. 473, 477 (1964) and 38
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 392, 403-04 (1964). For a good summary of the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
Rav. 67-68, 76 & nn.5, 43-50 (1960).
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the initial recognition of detentions is statutory and in states where it
is judicial, have recognized that practical considerations for upholding
detentions are significant.30 In addition, the standard may be sharp-
ened through a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion,31 and the
requirement of reasonableness, enforced by a balancing of practical
considerations, may be a bar to arbitrary action.32
Since the balancing process is an effort to provide the police with
only that amount of investigative and preventitive power consistent
with individual freedoms, it is important to note that detentions and
frisks have been justified only for purposes of preliminary investiga-
tions, crime prevention, and the safety of police while engaged in
investigation and crime prevention. 33 Whenever the police use the de-
tention as an arrest and the frisk incident to the detention as an evi-
dence-gathering search they are violating the fourth amendment's re-
quirement that an arrest which will validate a search be based on
probable cause. Clearly, the ideal solution to the problem created by
the unrestricted use of detentions would be a system which permits
30 See cases cited note 4 supra.
31 See Porter v. Wilson, 245 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Cal. 1965); People v. Anonymous, 48
Misc. 2d 713, 265 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Nassau County Ct. 1965); Leagre, supra note 1, at 415.
32 For the balancing of practical considerations to be a bar to arbitrary action, the
criteria used to determine whom the police are to detain must be rationally related to
the objectives sought-crime prevention, preliminary investigation, and police safety-
and uniformly applied. In an attempt to provide appropriate criteria for uniform appli-
cation, the New York State Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials has enumer-
ated a number of factors which a law enforcement officer should consider in determining
whether there is, under the New York "stop and frisk" law, N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.
§ 180-a, "reasonable suspicion" which justifies stopping a suspect:
i. The demeanor of the suspect.
ii. The gait and manner of the suspect.
iii. Any knowledge the officer may have of the suspect's background or
character.
iv. Whether the suspect is carrying anything, and what he is carrying.
v. The manner in which the suspect is dressed, including bulges in clothing
-when considered in light of all of the other factors.
vi. The time of the day or night the suspect is observed.
vii. Any overheard conversation of the suspect.
viii. The particular streets and areas involved.
ix. Any information received from third persons, whether they are known
or unknown.
x. Whether the suspect is consorting with others whose conduct is "reason-
ably suspect."
xi. The suspect's proximity to known criminal conduct.
(This listing is not meant to be all inclusive.)
New York State Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials, Memorandum Re: The
"Stop-and-Frisk" and "Knock, Knock" Laws (1964), reprinted in HALL & KAMtsAR, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 23, 234 (1965).
33 See authorities cited notes 2 & 4 supra.
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the police to detain in order to prevent crime, to investigate, and to
search persons detained so far as is necessary for the protection of the
police, but which deters the police from using detentions for obtaining
evidence against persons whom they could not otherwise search.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The tension between the use of detentions and the fourth amend-
ment is most visible in cases where the frisk or other search incident to
a detention has revealed a weapon, an item the possession of which is
a crime,34 or the fruits of a crime, and the party detained is seeking, in
a subsequent criminal trial, to prevent the items discovered from being
admitted into evidence.36 Two positions regarding the admissibility
of items found pursuant to a detention search are: (1) anything found
pursuant to a permissible weapon-oriented search is admissible because
obtained as a result of an authorized search; and (2) the search is con-
sidered unlawful, therefore nothing is admissible-it is, however,
acknowledged that officers will disregard the law and make such
searches where they feel a need to protect themselves.36 A third position
suggested here as more practicable than the others, is that while the
defensive frisk be construed as lawful, nothing be admissible as evi-
dence where the search or frisk is carried on with less than probable
cause for arrest.
The first position, with the qualification that only weapons or other
items the possession of which is a crime are admissible, has been
adopted by the New York legislature and accepted by the New York
state courts.37 The essence of this position is a step-by-step approach to
34 See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. CODE § 408 (burglars' tools).
35 This is the way in which most of the cases cited in note 4 supra were presented
to the courts. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding inadmissible evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal search).
36 Because of the public demand for more effective service than the police would be
allowed to render under the law (especially where detentions and frisks are not recog-
nized as lawful), the police often consider themselves pressured into violating the law
with respect to on-the-street stoppings and searches and seizures incident thereto.
LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current
Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 444 (1965); Parker, The Police
Service-A Key to Community Quality, 55 J. CPizj. L., C. & P.S. 273, 276 (1964); Wilson,
Police Authority in a Free Society, 54 J. CIuM. L., C. & P.S. 175, 177 (1963). Vorenburg,
supra note 2, at 424, notes that what has been done in the case of detentions arising out
of routine patrol is to assume that the police will do what they think necessary even
if they do not have probable cause; he contends that this approach to, or failure to
approach, the problem is impermissible.
37 New York's "stop and frisk" law, N.Y. CODE CriM. Pnoc. § 180-a, provides that when
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detentions in which the information obtained in one step is used to
justify the next step. This method is illustrated by the leading New
York case of People v. Rivera.38 At 1:30 a.m. on May 25, 1962,39 police
officers observed two men who walked in front of a bar and grill,
stopped, looked in the window, resumed walking for a few steps, came
back, looked in the window again, and then walked away rapidly. One
of the officers stopped them and patted the outside of the defendant's
clothing. In doing so he felt a hard object which he thought was a
pistol. He then reached inside the defendant's pocket and removed a
fully loaded pistol. The New York Court of Appeals recognized the
authority of the police to stop and question persons under suspicious
circumstances and held that this authority carried with it the right to
frisk the persons questioned because of the danger of armed resis-
tance.40 The frisk was reasonable when Rivera was detained, and, after
the hard object had been felt, probable cause for arrest existed.41 Since
the frisk was a reasonable interference with the defendant's privacy,
and the subsequent search which resulted in removing the pistol from
Rivera's pocket was valid as incident to a lawful arrest, evidence ob-
tained thereby was not acquired in violation of the defendant's con-
stitutional rights and was admissible.
a policeman has detained a person and "reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life
or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon," and if he finds a weapon
or "any other thing the possession of which may constitute a crime" he may take it
from the detained person. In cases interpreting this provision, and in other cases which
were decided after the passage of the law but not governed by it, the New York courts
have held that items which the police officer could take from the detained person are
admissible as evidence. See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); People v. Peters, 44 Misc. 2d 470, 254 N.Y.S.2d 10
(Westchester County Ct. 1964), aff'd, 35 U.S.L. WaraK 2037 (N.Y. Ct. App. July 7, 1966).
See generally LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law ...Has Not ...
Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 308-11 (discussing frisks incident to detentions).
8 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
39 The occurrences out of which Rivera arose took place before the effective date of
the New York "stop and frisk" law, but the decision was handed down after the law
had been enacted. The court in effect accommodated its judgment on the reasonable-
ness of the detention and the frisk to the provisions of the statute despite the fact that
the law did not govern the situation, People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965), and despite some New York precedents which
would indicate a contrary result. See New York cases cited in ARRzsr 346 n.13.
40 The information which the policeman possessed was deemed sufficient to allow
him to frisk Rivera. This holding must mean that the standard for believing the suspect
to be armed and dangerous is very low, and possibly that the police may frisk any person
whom they may stop on the street for questioning at night.
41 People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 447, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35-36 (1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 978 (1965). The frisk serves as a means of obtaining probable cause for arrests, and
the subsequent search of the person which involves removing the gun from his clothing
is valid because incident to a lawful arrest.
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In People v. Pugach,42 the Court of Appeals extended the doctrine of
the Rivera case to cover the search of a brief case carried by the de-
fendant when he was being interrogated by officers in a police car. The
dissent pointed out that this search was not necessary to protect the
officers since they could have achieved the same protection merely by
moving the brief case out of the petitioner's reach and concluded that
the search was therefore unlawful.43 In a subsequent case, People v.
Peters,44 where the detaining officer testified that in frisking the defen-
dant, he thought the object which he felt in the defendant's pocket
might be a knife, it was held that burglary tools taken from a person
detained under the statute were admissible as evidence in a prosecu-
tion for felonious possession of burglar's tools.
The argument for admissibility in these cases is that the police are
proceeding in accordance with a lawful procedure which consists of
an initial frisk that is reasonable because of the need to protect the
detaining officers and then, after the hard object in the suspect's pocket
has been touched, the officer's removal of the object is reasonable
42 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 936 (1965). Like Rivera,
the fact situation presented by this case took place before the effective date of the "stop
and frisk" law.
43 Id. at 70-71, 204 N.E.2d at 178-79. The dissent is consistent with the claimed pur-
poses of the "frisk." Any search is an inconvenience and an indignity; if a search is to
be justified only on the grounds that it is needed to protect the officers, and if clear
alternative means of protecting the officers are feasible, the alternative which involves
no search or the more limited search should be chosen.
44 44 Misc. 2d 470, 254 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Westchester County Ct. 1964), aff'd, 34 U.S.L. WEEK
2037 (N.Y. Ct. App. July 7, 1966). Here an off-duty policeman observed defendant Peters
and another man tiptoeing around the hall of an apartment building at 1 p.m. When
they saw that they were being observed, they rapidly descended the stairs. The officer
pursued and overtook Peters. The court agreed with the officer that Peters' explanation
of his presence in the building-that he was visiting a married girl friend whom he
declined to name-was unsatisfactory and held that the officer could legally frisk him.
This was the first case presented to the New York Court of Appeals under the "stop
and frisk" law. The provision in the law governing the frisk is as follows:
When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this
section [see text accompanying note 28 supra] and reasonably suspects that he
is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon.
If the police officer finds such a weapon or any other thing the possession of
which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of
the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed,
or arrest such person.
N.Y. CODE Clmr. PROC. § 180-a. A provision quite similar in many respects has been
included in the ALI's MODEL CODE OF PEE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02(5) (Tent.
Draft No. 1, March 1, 1966). This provision is as follows:
(5) Search for Dangerous Weapons. A law enforcement officer who has stopped
or ordered any person to remain in his presence pursuant to this section may, if
he reasonably believes that his safety so requires, search such person and his
immediate surroundings, but only to the extent necessary to discover any
dangerous weapons which may on that occasion be used against the officer.
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since he has probable cause to arrest the suspect and to search incident
to that arrest. Thus, since no unreasonable search or seizure is made,
the items found pursuant to this procedure are admissible. 45
This position enables the police to investigate and patrol aggres-
sively and to take adequate precautions for their own safety while
doing so. It is consistent with legislative and judicial deference to the
policeman's expertise and intuition for the probabilities of criminal
activity and the dangers inherent in a particular fact situation. It recog-
nizes that if the police are not allowed to frisk, they may well be sub-
jected to considerable danger. However, since the probable cause
requirements for a detention and for a frisk are slight and the criteria
are very subjective, any incident on a dark night could produce an auto-
matically sanctioned evidentiary search. 46 Thus, to validate a frisk,
the officer need only say that he noticed a bulge in the suspect's jacket
or a furtive movement which might indicate that he was armed.47 Since
45 The Uniform Arrest Act jurisdictions also appear to have accepted the position
that weapons and other items which are found pursuant to a frisk and the possession
of which is a crime are admissible. Under this act, a policeman may search incident
to a valid detention when he has "reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger
if the person possesses a dangerous weapon." Warner, supra note 5, at 344. In State v.
Moore, 187 A.2d 807 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1963), for example, a policeman stopped a car
which was being driven slowly back and forth in front of a service station late at night.
After noting that the jacket pockets of both occupants of the car bulged, he frisked
them and found pistols. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the pistols were ad-
missible into evidence since the officer had a right to detain where he had reasonable
ground to suspect that a crime was about to be committed and the right to frisk since
he reasonably thought he was in danger. Ibid. It is unclear whether the court held that
the frisk was valid as a reasonable adjunct to the detention (reasonable when the bulg-
ing pockets were observed) or that the policeman's observation of the bulging pockets
gave him probable cause to search or arrest. As an alternative ground for justifying the
search, apparently thrown in as an afterthought, the court stated that the search could
also be supported as incident to a valid arrest for a traffic violation. Id. at 821-22.
Although the propriety of a search incident to a traffic violation has been questioned
under many circumstances, in this case it seems that a search for weapons of the persons
arrested was proper since the large bulges in the suspects' pockets gave the policeman
strong reason to believe that the men were armed.
Although many of the courts which have recognized detentions in the absence of
legislation have not faced the question whether items discovered pursuant to weapon-
oriented detention searches are admissible, there is some support in the cases for the
proposition that such items are admissible. See, e.g., People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d
448, 551, 380 P.2d 658, 660, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20 (1963) (dictum); People v. Simon, 45
Cal. 2d 645, 650, 290 P.2d 531, 533 (1955) (dictum).
46 When carried to its logical conclusion, this position could result in admission of all
items which the police might encounter in the process of making a proper frisk, since
the nature of the discovered item does not change the reasonableness of the search.
47 Comment, supra note 9, 51 CALF. L RaEV. at 922 n.134, refers to searches incident
to arrests for traffic violations where the officer claims he feared for his safety thusly:
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people seldom challenge searches which produce nothing,48 nearly
every case which comes before a court is one in which the officer's as-
sessment of the situation is strongly reinforced by the discovery of a
weapon or criminal tools, 49 and there may be strong incentive for him
to fabricate grounds for a frisk since evidence leading to a conviction
may be obtained thereby. As a result, the reliability of the officer's testi-
mony in these cases should be subject to considerable doubt.6 0 The
probable existence of such situations should warrant the application
of a "high visibility" standard, like those announced in recent confes-
sion cases, 51 in order to insure that the detained party's constitutional
rights have been respected. The lack of this, or any other, safeguard
in the New York law has the ultimate effect of legalizing otherwise
illegal searches by simply clothing them in the rhetoric of "stop and
frisk."52
Almost a polar opposite of the first position on the admissibility of
evidence is the second-that all of the items discovered by frisking are
inadmissible because the frisk, since not based on probable cause for
arrest, is unreasonable. Such a rule would deter the police from using
the frisk except where they feel it necessary because of danger to them-
selves. Although no explicit provision for police safety is made, in
"[A]s a practical matter it would be difficult to prove that no probable cause existed
if the officer were to testify that he observed a furtive movement or a suspicious bulge
under the driver's coat." This observation seems equally applicable here.
48 See authorities cited note 58 infra.
49 Cf. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv.
493, 506 (1955).
50 The incentive to search as many persons as possible is very high where any weapons
(or items like burglars' tools) found would be admissible. The incentive to obtain ad-
missible evidence and the ease with which the required standard can be fabricated
lead to a substantial danger that the police would frisk a considerable number of persons
whom they would not actually have probable cause to frisk in the hope of turning up
evidence. Were there no incentive to turn up evidence to convict the persons frisked, as
would be the case if the exclusionary rule were applied to the fruits of the frisk, no
incentive to stop and frisk would exist which does not exist under the second position.
51 Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
52 One suspects that, in cases such as Rivera, the result may be dictated by an un-
spoken desire to expand powers of detention and search because of increasing concern
with rising crime rates and that the safety of the policeman is nothing but a convenient
vehicle for the expansion of police powers to search for evidence. A significant result
of these extended powers of search is the conviction of persons through evidence ob-
tained by searches made where the police had neither probable cause to arrest or
probable cause to search. If a lessening of the constitutional standards for searches
is what is sought, it would seem advisable to examine the subject on its own merits
rather than obfuscate the real issue by speaking of police safety.
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practice the illegality of the frisk will not deter the police from detain-
ing and from frisking when they believe they are in danger.
An important consideration which militates against this position is
that it reduces the policeman's respect for law. The system is taking a
two-faced position in requiring for practical purposes an act which it
declares illegal. It would be surprising if this did not lead to a dis-
respect for lawful police practices which would operate directly against
the policy of deterring unlawful police practices. Since one of the
primary aims of recent Supreme Court cases excluding illegally ob-
tained items from evidence was to discourage illegal police practices,
this result would appear unacceptable. 3
Even assuming that the officers will generally frisk where they be-
lieve they are in danger, the possibility of obtaining admissible evi-
dence might serve as an inducement to an officer to delay frisking when
actually in danger. Moreover, if the search is deemed illegal, as it would
be in jurisdictions which have not legislatively or judicially recognized
detentions and frisks, the party detained and frisked has cause for a civil
action in trespass against the officer.54 An officer may also be subject
to criminal prosecution or disciplinary proceedings for making illegal
searches and seizures.5 5 Furthermore, in most states some degree of re-
53 A concern with lawfulness of police conduct runs through both the confession
cases and the search and seizure cases. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965);
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319, 325-26.
54 Bull v. Armstrong, 254 Ala. 390, 48 So. 2d 467 (1950); Silva v. MacAuley, 135 Cal. App.
249, 26 P.2d 887 (1933); Fennemore v. Armstrong, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 35, 96 Ad. 204 (1915);
McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa 368, 98 N.W. 881 (1904); McMahan's Adm'x v. Draffen, 242
Ky. 785, 47 S.W.2d 716 (1932) (dictum); Deaderick v. Smith, 33 Tenn. App. 151, 230 S.W.2d
406 (1950); Regan v. Harkey, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 16, 87 S.W. 1164 (1905). See also 79 C.J.S.
Searches and Seizures § 101a (1952).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), indicates that a private party has an action for
damages against police officers making an illegal search, at least where the conduct is
outrageous, under REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). Accord, Cohen v. Norris,
300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962). But see Mackey v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 579 (W.D.S.C.
1957) (unlawful search of home by state police did not deprive occupant of any of the
rights, privileges or immunities secured to him by the Federal Constitution or laws-
probably overruled by Monroe v. Pape, supra, and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). See
generally AEREsr 411-25 (1965); Foote, supra note 49, at 509-13; Mathes & Jones, Toward
a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEo. LJ.
889, 899-907 (1965).
55 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 621 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-703 (1948); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 629.402 (Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 558.190 (1953); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 94-3506 (1947); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 33: 1-65 (1940); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1846; N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12-17-06 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 535 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-28-52 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-88 (1960 Replacement Volume); WAsH. REv. CODE
§§ 10.79.040, 10.79.045 (1961).
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sistance to an unlawful search is permissible.5 6 Thus, if a frisk is illegal,
not only may the suspect resist with an amount of force necessary to
repel the policeman, 57 but, in subsequent litigation, such as an assault
and battery action by either party against the other, the suspect may
raise the illegality of the policeman's conduct as a complete justifica-
tion for his actions as well as an affirmative basis for recovery. Although
civil suits for illegal searches and criminal suits or disciplinary pro-
ceedings against policemen for illegal searches are infrequent,5 8 it
seems inappropriate to impose the risk of civil liability or criminal
prosecution on a policeman who is taking reasonable precautions for
his own safety in the line of duty. The risk of lawful resistance, how-
ever insubstantial it may be in practice, also seems an inappropriate
one to cast upon the policeman who frisks when he suspects he may
be in danger.
The policy of the first position-police safety in detention situations
-as well as that of the second-deterrence of unreasonable searches-
would be promoted by the third position: the defensive frisk is lawful
but nothing is admissible where the frisk is carried on with less than
probable cause for arrest. The third position would recognize a search
for weapons or a frisk as a permissible means of protecting the
police but not as a permissible evidence-gathering device. The reason
for excluding items found pursuant to a frisk is that there are, as
indicated earlier, substantial difficulties in enforcing the desired limi-
56 If the search was unlawful because incident to an unlawful arrest it could be lawfully
resisted. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REv. 201, 264 (1940), and authorities cited
therein. This of course rests on the ground that the search involves a deliberate touching
of the person without color of right and therefore constitutes an intentional tort. How-
ever, some states may have changed this result by statutes making resistance even to an
unlawful arrest illegal. See ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-7 (1965); Warner, supra note 5, at
345. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). Since under these
laws resistance to an unlawful arrest by an officer is not lawful, resistance to a search
incident to such an arrest is probably also unlawful. See State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169,
214 A.2d 428 (1965) (prospective overruling of doctrine of right to resist illegal arrest).
57 The common law rule is that a person may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an illegal arrest. WHARTON, CaumiNAL LA-W §§ 851-54 (12th
ed. 1932). American jurisdictions generally adhere to this rule. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J.
Super. 169, 175, 214 A.2d 428, 431, 433 (1965) (dictum); see People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308,
121 N.E.2d 238 (1954); Note, Justification for Use of Force in the Criminal Law, 13 STAN. L.
REv. 566, 567 & n.7 (1961).
58 Criminal prosecutions for illegal searches are extremely rare, and the threat they pose
is an ineffective sanction. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41-42, 47 (1949) (Murphy and
Rutledge, JJ., dissenting); ARREsr 425-27; Foote, supra note 49, at 494-95. For example, a
federal statute, 18 U.S.C. 2236 (1964), making it a misdemeanor for a federal officer to
participate in an unlawful search and seizure, has been in force since 1921, yet there are
no reported cases in which any federal officer has been prosecuted under it.
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tations on the power to frisk; thus, application of a high visibility
standard in the form of a general exclusionary rule appears to be
warranted. 59 Since the breadth of the detention and frisk standards
limits the safeguards protecting individuals against unreasonable de-
tentions and searches, the only feasible way to insure that detentions
are used for legitimate purposes and not for "fishing expeditions"
appears to be the exclusion of any item found as a result of a frisk or
search based on less than probable cause for arrest.60 While sanction-
ing the use of frisks by the police for protection, this position would
improve upon the first by withdrawing the incentive to frisk which is
occasioned by the possibility of obtaining admissible evidence. At the
same time, the detained party reasonably suspected of having a weapon
is afforded all of the safeguards provided under the second position
except those which are admittedly ineffective-the right to recover in
a civil suit for trespass, the criminal penalties for illegal search, and
the right lawfully to resist an officer making such a search. 61
A rule designed to accomplish this could be formulated as follows:
The fruits of a search based on less than probable cause for arrest shall
not be admissible as evidence in a criminal trial of the party aggrieved;
however, a policeman shall not be deemed to act unlawfully or outside
his authority if he makes a weapon-oriented search of a person lawfully
detained for questioning where he reasonably suspects that the de-
tained person may be armed and dangerous, and where the search is
the only feasible method of disarming him.
Such a rule would not encourage officers to search where the search is
not necessary to protect them since no admissible evidence could be
obtained thereby.62 Furthermore, if the officer delays the search until
Civil suits for illegal searches are seldom brought against policemen and the success ratio
of such suits is apparently low. See Aiugrsr 411-12; Coakley, Restrictions in the Law of
Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 2, 5 (1957). Furthermore, it is generally conceded that civil suits
for trespass against officers constitute an ineffective sanction. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
41-43 (1949) (Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282
P.2d 905 (1955); Foote, supra note 49, at 498.
59 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
60 It is admitted that detentions may be used for harassment purposes. Yet little incentive
to use them as such is present under this position that is not also present under the second
position.
61 See notes 54-58 supra and the accompanying text.
62 For a discussion of harassment incentives see LaFave, supra note 36, at 447-55.
Whether or not the frisk is legal or the evidence admissible, the weapon (or other
item the possession of which is itself a crime) does not have to be returned to the suspect.
See, e.g., People v. Jordan, 87 Misc. 2d 33, 234 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Orleans County Ct. 1962)
(revolver excluded from evidence but application for its return denied); State v. Wood, 183
Ore. 650, 195 P.2d 703 (1948). Although the general rule is that one whose property has
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he has probable cause for arrest or search, then any items obtained
would be admissible.65 The scope of the search permitted should be
limited to one reasonably calculated to protect the officers; in some
instances a search somewhat more extensive than a frisk might be
needed,64 but in no event should the search be more detailed than
one needed to discover weapons, 65 nor should it be made if a feasible
way to protect the officer other than the search exists.66
This rule would most appropriately be adopted by legislative action
since it embodies wise policy but may well not be required by the
Constitution. Judicial recognition, however, is also feasible. The Su-
preme Court, in exercising its power to prescribe rules of procedure,
including rules of evidence, for the lower federal courts,67 may rule
that evidence obtained through a frisk based on less than probable
cause for arrest is inadmissible. The courts of appellate and original
jurisdiction in each state, insofar as they have power to formulate
rules for admissibility (on nonconstitutional grounds)68 could also
presumably require the exclusion of evidence pursuant to this rule.
been illegally seized is entitled to have such property returned to him, contraband, or
property the possession of which is illegal, which has been illegally seized need not be
returned. E.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951); United States v. Smalls, 223
F. Supp. 387, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); cf. United States v. Macri, 185 F. Supp. 144 (D. Conn.
1960) (illegally seized property used in violation of tax laws not returned).
63 See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 807 (1959). One possible drawback of this
position is that police may sometimes not frisk even when they feel they are in danger in
the hope of gathering enough information to meet the standards for probable cause for
arrest so they can then search and obtain admissible evidence.
64 However, this should not be construed to validate for any purpose a search such as
the ofie in People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
936 (1965).
65 See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02, comment at 102-03 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, March 1, 1966). The identity of the objects searched for (weapons) should not
obfuscate the distinction in basis between a search justified only for the protection of an
officer making a relatively unfocused inquiry into suspicious activity and a search for
evidence pursuant to probable cause sufficient for a search warrant or one justified on
grounds of both protection and the desire for evidence and safeguarded by probable cause
for arrest.
66 See People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 70-71, 204 N.E.2d 176, 178-79 (1964) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 880 U.S. 936 (1965).
67 FED. R. CRM. P. 26; see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-98 (1914).
68 Courts have power to formulate their own rules of procedure, including rules of
evidence, insofar as the rules are not prescribed by state and federal constitutions and the
state legislature. E.g., Appeal of Dattilo, 136 Conn. 488, 72 A.2d 50 (1947); Perin v. Peuler,
373 Mich. 531, 542, 130 N.W.2d 4, 10 (1964); 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 7(d) (3d ed. 1964
Pocket Supp. 55); Green, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power
Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 482, 487 (1940). In addition, state constitutional
provisions or statutes may confer on courts the express power to formulate their own rules
1966] Stop and Frisk
I It may be argued, however, that such a rule is constitutionally com-
pelled. The Supreme Court, in order to preserve probable cause as a
standard for searches leading to admissible evidence, might rule that
the dangers presented to the public from unreasonable searches be-
cause of the admissibility of evidence obtained through detention
searches are so great that although the frisk is lawful, it will not give
rise to admissible evidence.69
of procedure. See, e.g., Schratt v. Accurate Instrument Co., 314 Ill. App. 96, 40 N.E.2d
823 (1942) (upholding a statute permitting courts to promulgate rules of evidence). Appel-
late courts may also promulgate rules of procedure, including rules of evidence, for inferior
courts in the same system under the inherent power of supervising inferior courts or by
reason of constitutional provisions or statutes. See, e.g., Ex parte Foshee, 246 Ala. 604,
21 So. 2d 827 (1945); Brown v. Haymore, 43 Ariz. 466, 32 P.2d 1027 (1934); Kolkman v.
People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931); Ernst v. Lamb, 73 Colo. 132, 213 Pac. 994 (1923);
Wilhelm v. South Indian River Co., 98 Fla. 970, 124 So. 729 (1929); People v. Cowdrey, 360
Ill. 633, 196 N.E. 838 (1935); People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934); Jones v.
Eastern Michigan Motorbuses, 287 Mich. 619, 283 N.W. 710 (1939); Nichols v. State, 109
Neb. 335, 191 N.W. 333 (1922); Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936); Sackheim v.
Piqueron, 215 N.Y. 62, 109 N.E. 109, 112 (1915); Beach v. Runnels, 379 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964); White v. Million, 175 Wash. 189, 27 P.2d 320 (1933).
Within the bounds of constitutional and statutory requirements, courts of original
jurisdiction have some discretion in deciding what evidence is to be admitted. See,
e.g., State v. Black, 5 N.J. Misc. 48, 135 At. 685 (1926) (items admissible as evidence
despite being obtained by illegal police search-rule of evidence). Appellate courts,
within similar bounds, may decide whether evidence is properly admissible when re-
viewing lower court judgments. Representative of the power of appellate courts to
decide questions of admissibility are the state cases which involved the admissibility
of evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures in the period from 1914 to
1949. It had been held, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), that evi-
dence obtained as a result of an illegal search by federal officials was inadmissible
in federal courts, but the exclusion was not held to be constitutionally required. Con-
sequently, state courts, in passing on the admissibility of illegally acquired evidence, were
not required by the federal constitution to exclude such evidence, and the state appellate
courts made decisions on the admissibility of evidence of this sort unhampered by con-
stitutional or statutory requirements. Many state courts decided that such evidence was
inadmissible, but a larger number reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Youman v.
Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920) (inadmissible); People v. Defore, 242
N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926) (admissible); State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490
(1936) (admissible); Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 138 At1. 679 (1927) (ad-
missible). See also the additional state cases cited in Tables D-H of the appendix to the
majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 35-38 (1949), and Green, supra at 489
("courts change the law of evidence by decision').
69 An analogy may be found in the recent confession cases where the Supreme Court has
established rules for the procedure which must be followed during interrogation in order
to produce admissible confessions. Rather than judge whether the statement was in-
voluntary (or coerced) in each individual situation, the Court has stated that unless certain
procedures (or their equivalents) are followed, the statements obtained are inadmissible.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Since
these procedures, or their equivalents, are constitutionally required of the states, and since
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In summary, the procedure suggested above would seem to be the
most reasonable accommodation of the competing goals of police effi-
ciency and individual freedom from unreasonable searches. On the
one hand, it assures police that they can detain persons for prelimi-
nary on-the-street investigation and crime prevention with adequate
provision for their safety, and, on the other, it minimizes the potential
for abuse of the powers to detain and frisk by assuring that frisks
cannot be used as general exploratory searches.
situations could be easily formulated where the statements obtained from the defendants
were voluntary despite the absence of such procedures, these cases may indicate that a
court may exclude evidence on constitutional grounds where the defendant's rights have
not been violated but where the court feels that it is necessary to exclude such evidence to
protect the rights of others.
